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Article
Counterclaims in Investor-State
Arbitration
Yaraslau Kryvoi ∗
ABSTRACT
Although nearly all arbitration rules provide for the right
to assert counterclaims in investor-state disputes, many
tribunals are reluctant to allow such counterclaims. The two
key obstacles examined by tribunals and this Article, are
investor consent to counterclaims and determination of investor
obligations towards the host State.
Jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (IUSCT),
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) tribunals, and United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) tribunals suggests that
if the relevant treaty contains an offer of jurisdiction only in
relation to disputes arising out of State obligations, tribunals
are reluctant to extend their jurisdiction over counterclaims.
However, if the relevant dispute resolution provision is broad
or the parties subsequently alter the jurisdictional offer either
explicitly or implicitly, tribunals are more likely to allow
counterclaims.
This Article shows that in the absence of provisions setting
out investor obligations in international treaties, general
principles of law appear to be an appropriate source of
international law to determine such obligations. The State may
∗
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of West London and Co-Chair of
the International Courts Committee, American Bar Association. Email:
kryvoi@post.harvard.edu. The author prepared a number of counterclaims in
investor-state disputes while in private practice. The Article benefited from
feedback of participants of the 2011 Harvard Institute for Global Law and
Policy writing workshop. He wishes to thank professors Daniel Bradlow,
James Crawford, Ming Du, Anne Orford as well as Noah Rubins, Sergey
Usoskin, Suha Jubranb, Nicolás Perrone, and Benjamin Ellison for their
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. All errors, however, reside with the
author.
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also assert counterclaims if the investor breached its
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the
State. The State, however, cannot assert counterclaims in
investor-state arbitration based on purely domestic law
obligations of investors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, States have concluded over
2,500 bilateral investment treaties and numerous multilateral
1
agreements to facilitate foreign investment. According to an
almost universal consensus, foreign investments benefit host
States by stimulating greater competition, generating an influx
of capital, technology, and managerial skills, and creating new
2
jobs. Foreign investors also benefit from access to new
3
markets, a cheaper workforce, and natural resources.
Nearly all investment treaties provide for arbitration to
4
resolve disputes. The system of investor-state dispute
resolution endows private persons—either individuals or
corporations—with the capacity to submit a claim against a
State without the intervention of their respective national
5
governments. Rather than forcing investors to rely either on
domestic courts or on State-to-State political negotiations,
international investment treaties provide investors with a right
to initiate dispute settlements directly against the host State in
6
a neutral forum.
Under these treaties, investors can typically choose to
submit a dispute to ICSID or to an ad hoc tribunal established
1. UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment
Agreements (2008-June 2009), INT’L INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS MONITOR NO.
3,
2009,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3766&lang=1.
2. See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett, The Causes of Globalization, 33 COMP. POL.
STUD. 941, 947 (2000); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING
COSTS 10–18 (2002); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., FDI IN
FIGURES (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/43/48462282.pdf.
3. See generally Garrett, supra note 2 (analyzing changes in trade and
foreign investment policy that has led to increased international market
integration).
4. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, at 78, U.N. Sales No.
E.07.II.D.10 (2007).
5. See YARASLAU KRYVOI, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 26–27 (2010).
6. Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a
Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L.
471, 476 (2009).
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7

under the rules of UNCITRAL. Treaties may also provide for
dispute resolution procedures of other institutions such as the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, or the London Court of International
8
Arbitration.
Because investment treaties are primarily intended to
encourage foreign investment, they are usually silent on the
rights of States vis-à-vis investors and obligations of investors
9
vis-à-vis States. Hardwired into the very structure of
investment treaties therefore, is an apparent asymmetry
between the rights of investors and the obligations of States.
The States’ right to counterclaim seeks to counterbalance
this asymmetry—counterclaims facilitate equality of the
parties and, rendered in a single forum, make investor-state
10
dispute resolution more efficient.
Counterclaims, however, remain relatively rare and
tribunals are often reluctant to allow them. It has been
suggested that States rarely bring counterclaims because of
11
their counsels’ failure to advise them on this matter. Indeed,
State counterclaims present a number of particular legal
problems: express investor consent to counterclaims or their
obligations are absent in treaties, and the nature of the
investor-state dispute resolution system is primarily tailored to
12
protect investor interests.
This Article suggests that such constraints should not be
fatal to a State’s right to assert counterclaims against foreign
investors. The right to counterclaim is a procedural right
customary to all major arbitration rules, including those used
7. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and
Protection of Investment. U.S.-Arg., art. VII, Nov. 19, 1991, 31 I.L.M 124
(1992).
8. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
China and the Government of the Belize on the Protection and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, art. 7, Jan. 16, 1999.
9. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 7–11 (2008).
10. See infra pp. 220–22.
11. Pierre Lalive & Laura Halonen, On the Availability of Counterclaims
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in CZECH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 141, 154 (Alexander J. Bělohlávek & Naděžda Rozehnalová eds., vol. II
2011).
12. See Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International
Arbitration, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 169 (2011) (discussing how
undercapitalized local subsidiaries often appear as claimants in arbitral
proceedings, and complicate the prospect of obtaining and enforcing arbitral
awards against properly capitalized parent companies).
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13

by ICSID or UNCITRAL tribunals. Although investment
treaties are typically concluded in the interest of investors, they
usually provide for broad jurisdiction over disputes concerning
an investment and do not restrict the parties’ obligations to
14
only those contained in the investment treaties.
Obligations of investors arise not from the express
language of treaties, but out of applicable law, stipulated either
in the investment treaty, arbitration agreement or determined
15
by the investor-state tribunal. This Article demonstrates that
investor obligations may arise under sources of international
law other than investment treaties, such as general principles
16
of law. Secondary sources of international law such as case
law and scholarly writings also serve as evidence of
17
international law rules applicable to investors. Under certain
circumstances, relevant investor obligations can also be found
18
in investment contracts with States.
The next part of this Article provides an overview of
counterclaims, which States asserted under the rules of IUSCT,
ICSID, and UNCITRAL. Part III sets forth the main problems
related to the requirement of investor consent to counterclaims.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that substantive obligations of
investors can be found in sources of international law other
than investment treaties, and with certain limitations, in
investor-state contracts.

13. See, e.g., Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98,
art. 19.3 (Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules];
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, art. 46, Oct. 16, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 17 U.S.T.
1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; THE ARBITRATION INST. OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF THE ARBITRATION INSTITUTE
OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
art. 10.3, available at
http://www.sccinstitute.se/filearchive/1/13207/1999_web_a4_vanliga_2004_eng
_rev_2005.pdf [hereinafter STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES]; INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS, rule 40 [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES]; INT’L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION, art. 5(5) [hereinafter ICC
ARBITRATION RULES].
14. See infra p. 232.
15. See infra p. 232.
16. See infra pp. 248–50.
17. See infra pp. 250–51.
18. See infra pp. 239–42.
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II. PROCEDURAL RULES FOR ASSERTING
COUNTERCLAIMS
A. INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES AND COUNTERCLAIMS
A counterclaim in investor-state disputes is a claim
submitted by a respondent in opposition to the claimant’s
19
claim.
Since investors initiate nearly all investor-state
20
disputes, counterclaims are typically submitted by host
States. Counterclaims make investor-state arbitration more
efficient for a number of reasons.
First, although investment treaties are inherently
asymmetrical and provide investors with rights but not
obligations, States can initiate and submit counterclaims,
21
which facilitate equality between the parties.
Second,
counterclaims arising from separate but related agreements
between the parties enhance time-efficient dispute resolution.
All major arbitration rules require that counterclaims
22
relate to the substance of the already initiated dispute.
Typically, counterclaims have a defensive nature and purport
23
to undermine the primary claim. In the majority of cases in
which counterclaims were presented they related to the main

19. Black’s Law Dictionary defines counterclaim as “[a] claim presented
by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 13). See
generally CHRISTIANA FOUNTOULAKIS, SET-OFF DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2010), for a discussion
of set-off defences and counterclaims in the context of international arbitration
claims.
20. See The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2011-1), INT’L CTR. FOR
SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., available at http://icsid.worldbank.org.
21. See, e.g., Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, art. 13,
Mar. 18, 1965 (as amended on Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/Rulesmain.jsp
(“The
convention
permits the institution of proceedings by host States as well as by investors
and the executive directors have constantly had in mind that the provisions of
the convention should be equally adapted to the requirements of both cases.”).
22. See, e.g., Claims Settlement Declaration Art II, para. 1, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 9 (1983) (stating that counterclaims from the IUSCT should relate
to the matter of the main claims); Commission on International Trade Law,
G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 21.3 (Dec. 15, 1976) (as amended in 2010) (stating that
counterclaims should be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction); ICSID
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, rule 40 (stating that counter claims must
arise “directly out of the subject matter of the dispute”).
23. CHRISTOPH SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
COMMENTARY 750 (2d ed. 2010).
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substance of the case and were not of an incidental nature.
Given the high cost of resolving disputes in international
25
arbitration, time-efficient dispute resolution is particularly
important for less developed countries. As the dissenting
opinion in a recent ICSID case, Roussalis v. Romania, pointed
out, rejection of jurisdiction over counterclaims may direct the
State to its domestic courts and if the judgment would be
adverse to the investor, another bilateral investment treaty
26
(BIT) claim may follow. That would result in a duplication of
27
proceedings, inefficiency, and increased transaction costs.
Host States may also be interested in counterclaims
because international arbitration offers superior international
enforcement prospects compared to domestic court judgments.
ICSID arbitration awards do not require any additional
procedures for recognition or enforcement: State parties to the
ICSID Convention are obligated to enforce the pecuniary
obligations imposed by that award within their territories as if
28
it were a final judgment of a court in that State. Most other
awards, such as those rendered under UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, can be enforced under the 1958 New York Convention,
which also provides for limited grounds on which awards might
29
be denied enforcement.
There is also a fairness argument. Many suggest that
foreign investors often have economic muscle that most host
30
States can hardly surpass. It appears that an unfair
asymmetry would arise if the investor could sue the host State
for breach of its obligations while the State may not do the
same. As the tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan put it:
It would be inequitable if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID
jurisdiction, the [foreign investor] could on the one hand
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/03/24,
Award,
¶
310
(Aug.
27,
2008),
http://italaw.com/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf (stating the legal costs
to the claimant (related to both the jurisdiction and merits phases of the
arbitration), amounted to $4.6 MM, while the respondent’s legal costs (for both
phases) were $13.2 MM).
26. Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (2011)
(Separate Opinion of Michael Reisman).
27. Id.
28. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.1.
29. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
New York Convention].
30. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Boeckstiegel, Enterprise v State: the New David
and Goliath?, 23 ARB. INT’L 93, 95 (2007).
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elevate its side of the dispute to international adjudication
and, on the other, preclude the [host State] from pursuing its
31
own claim for damages . . . .

Host States can now assert counterclaims against investors
32
under all major arbitration rules. Most notably, counterclaims
have been asserted under IUSCT, ICSID, and UNCITRAL
arbitration rules. Despite the view expressed in the literature
33
that counterclaims always fail, the next sections show that
this is not always the case.
B. IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
To date, the largest number of counterclaims asserted by
34
States has been under the rules of the IUSCT. The Claims
Settlement Declaration, which constitutes the basis of IUSCT
jurisdiction, provides that it was
. . . established for the purpose of deciding claims of
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any
counterclaim which arises out of the same contract,
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject
35
matter of that national’s claim . . . .

The IUSCT case law suggests that jurisdiction over a
counterclaim depends entirely on the presence of jurisdiction
36
over the claim. If jurisdiction over the claim fails, related
37
counterclaims should also be dismissed. If, however, the
tribunal asserts its jurisdiction over the counterclaim, it can
38
stand alone, even if the main claim has been withdrawn.
31. SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Procedural Order No. 2, 395 (Oct. 16,
2002), 8 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 293.
32. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 19.3;
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46; STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 13, art. 10.3; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, rule 40;
ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, art. 5(5).
33. See, e.g., Ana Vohryzek-Griest, State Counterclaims in Investor-State
Disputes: A History of 30 Years of Failure, 15 INT’L L., REVISTA COLOMBIANA
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 83, 84 (2009) (“State counterclaims in investorState disputes always fail”).
34. See generally, CHARLES NELSON BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE,
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998) (discussing the genesis,
structure, and results of the IUSCT).
35. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 22, at 1.
36. See, e.g, Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 79, 146–48 (1989).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Because IUSCT jurisdiction is defined in rather broad
terms, thousands of counterclaims have been filed at the
39
IUSCT. They have included counterclaims for advanced
payments, breach of contract, services rendered, defective
products, and other categories; all arising out of investor
40
contractual obligations.
C. ICSID CONVENTION
The 1966 ICSID Convention enabled private investors to
submit claims against States without intervention of their
41
respective national governments. The Convention and the
ICSID Arbitration Rules provide ICSID with jurisdiction over
42
counterclaims. Article 46 of the ICSID Convention stipulates:
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if
requested by a party, determine any incidental or additional
claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject
matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope
of the consent of the parties and are otherwise within the
43
jurisdiction of the Centre.

The ICSID Convention’s drafting history suggests that the
reason for the inclusion of counterclaims in the Convention was
44
to eliminate the necessity of separate proceedings. The
drafters emphasized that counterclaims should be covered by
consent of the parties and should not go beyond the tribunal’s
45
competence.
According to the Report of the Executive
Directors of the World Bank, the Convention is meant to be
equally adapted to the requirements of the institution of
46
proceedings brought by investors as well as by host States.
Until now, most State counterclaims against foreign
investors asserted under ICSID rules were for costs arising out
39. BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 34, at 99.
40. Id.
41. YARASLAU KRYVOI, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 26–30 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2010).
42. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46; ICSID ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 13, art. 40.
43. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 46.
44. 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE
ORIGIN AND THE FORMATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES
270 (2001).
45. Id. at 337, 422.
46. Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, ¶ 13, ICSID/15 (Mar. 18, 1965) [hereinafter ICSID Report].
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of non-ICSID proceedings, interest payments, or taxes. In
a majority of ICSID cases, tribunals asserted jurisdiction over
50
counterclaims but subsequently denied them on the merits.
In a few other cases, tribunals agreed with the merits of
51
counterclaims asserted by States.
D. UNCITRAL ARBITRAL RULES
The 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are commonly
52
used in investor-state disputes. Counterclaims in UNCITRAL
investor-state disputes have been rare, which is a consequence
of a rather narrow scope of jurisdiction of investment tribunals
53
under the old version of the rules. Until 2010, these rules
provided that the respondent could only bring a counterclaim
54
“arising out of the same contract.” Currently, the rules, in
relevant part, provide as follows:
In its statement of defense, or at a later stage in the arbitral
proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay
was justified under the circumstances, the respondent may
make a counterclaim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a

47. See, e.g., Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic
of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Award, 76 (Jan. 6, 1988), 4 ISCID Rep.
61 (1997).
48. See, e.g., Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v. Government of the People’s
Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, Award, ¶ 3.5 (Aug. 15,
1980), 1 ISCID Rep. 330 (1993).
49. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case
No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 562–64 (May 10, 1988), 1 ICSID Rep.
543 (1993).
50. See, e.g., Alex Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2,
Award, ¶¶ 196–201 (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID Rev. 395 (2002); Southern
Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Nov. 27, 1985), 3 ICSID Rep. 112
(1995); Klöckner Industrie–Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 16 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994);
Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl, 1 ISCIS Rep. ¶¶ 4.95–4.96; Adriano Gardella SpA
v. Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1,
Award, (Aug. 29, 1977), 1 ICSID Rep. 283 (1993).
51. See, e.g., Maritime International Nominees Establishment, 4 ISCID
Rep. at 76 (addressing counterclaims for the recovery of legal expenses
incurred by the government because of the investor's non-compliance with the
tribunal's recommendation).
52. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13.
53. See, e.g., Zeevi Holdings v. Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, (Oct. 25, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/ZeeviHoldingsv.BulgariaFinalAward.pdf; Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Decision on Jurisdiction Over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 78–79
(May 7, 2004), 15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010).
54. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 19.3.
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set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction
55
over it.

The requirement that a dispute should arise out of the
same contract was completely inappropriate in the context of
56
investor-state disputes. More counterclaims are likely to be
asserted by States now that the rules have been revised.
As this review of major arbitration rules suggests, investorstate tribunals can assert jurisdiction over counterclaims.
There is, however, a legitimate question of whether investors
consent to such counterclaims, because most investment
treaties do not provide for any obligations of foreign investors
and are generally concluded for the benefit of foreign investors
who usually initiate arbitral proceedings.
III. CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS
A. INVESTOR CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS
Historically, the main aim of investment treaties and
contracts was to moderate the exercise of sovereign power by
57
host States. Only States have a monopoly on using force to
regulate activities of all economic actors in their own territory.
The idea behind investment treaties is that it is the conduct of
States, rather than the conduct of investors, which needs to be
58
kept in check.
Today most treaties explicitly provide that their main goal
59
is to protect investors and facilitate foreign investments.
Investors are privileged and “traditionally [have been] afforded
60
rights without being subject to obligations. . . .”
Investors’ legal position under investment treaties can be
compared to that of third party beneficiaries in contracts—they

55. Commission on International Trade Law, supra note 22, art. 21.3.
56. See JAN PAULSSON & GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, REVISION OF THE
UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION
RULES
(2006),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf.
57. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 193 (2005).
58. See Gustavo Laborde, The Case for Host State Claims in Investment
Arbitration, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97, 98 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
U.K.–Kaz., Preamble, Nov. 23, 1995, GR. BRIT. T.S. NO. 30 (1996) (Cm. 3176)
(“Desiring to create favourable conditions for greater investment by nationals
and companies of one State in the territory of the other State.”).
60. MARC JACOB, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 21 (2010).
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61

have rights but not obligations. Treaties typically only enable
the investor, rather than the State, to submit claims to
62
arbitration. Investment treaties typically neither provide for
the submission of a State’s counterclaims nor even mention the
63
right of an investor to submit counter-claims. Some scholars
even dub investment arbitration as an international “ ’quasi64
judicial review’ of national regulatory action.”
Like all international treaties, investment treaties are
65
supposed to be interpreted in light of their object and purpose.
In the absence of any specific language providing for a
possibility of counterclaims against foreign investors, allowing
such counterclaims may seem problematic. Consent remains a
cornerstone of the system of international adjudication in
66
67
general and investor-state arbitration in particular.
If the investor limited its acceptance of jurisdiction to
claims based on the treaty, should only the treaty be the source
of rights and obligations in a particular dispute? To answer this
question, it is important to understand that the investment
treaty itself is not the basis for the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Investors are not parties to international treaties, and
therefore, cannot consent to arbitration in such treaties.
When a State enters into an investment treaty, it offers
eligible investors a right to arbitrate any relevant investment
68
disputes through international arbitration. If the investor
chooses to accept the offer, it usually does so by initiating
arbitration proceedings, thereby perfecting the parties’

61. Laborde, supra note 58, at 112.
62. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Greece–Rom., May 23, 1997, art. 9.2.
63. See id.
64. Hege Elisabeth Veenstra–Kjos, Counter-claims by Host States in
Investment Dispute Arbitration “Without Privity”, in NEW ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 597, 600 (Philippe Kahn & Thomas W.
Wälde eds., 2007); see also Gus van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 121 (2006).
65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
LAUTERPACHT,
ASPECTS
OF
ADMINISTRATION
OF
66. ELIHU
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 23 (1991).
67. See ICSID Report, supra note 46, ¶ 23.
68. See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID
ARBITRATION 35 (2004); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID
REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232 (1995).
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agreement to arbitrate the investment dispute. An investor’s
consent to arbitration can also be manifested in a separate
agreement with the State to arbitrate a claim under the
70
investment treaty.
Such consent typically incorporates by reference a certain
set of arbitration rules, which the parties agree to apply in full.
Neither such agreements nor requests for arbitration usually
71
contain an express reference to counterclaims. But narrow
wording of acceptance of the offer to arbitrate disputes should
not have the effect of excluding State counterclaims because [a]

BIT is not an á la carte selection of provisions among which the
72
investor can chose. If the arbitration rules include the procedural
73
74
right to submit counterclaims, the parties are bound by it.

Moreover, in a number of disputes, States themselves
initiated ICSID proceedings against investors under
75
investment treaties,
which makes the submission of
counterclaims a less controversial issue. But as the analysis
below suggests the narrow wording of a relevant dispute
resolution treaty provision may affect the tribunal’s subject
matter jurisdiction.
In AMTO v. Ukraine, a dispute arose on the basis of the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the Rules of the Arbitration
76
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). ECT
contains no mentioning of the right to counterclaim and covers
only disputes arising out of obligations of States:
Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of
another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the
latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged
77
breach of an obligation of the former under [the ECT].
69. See REED ET AL., supra note 68, at 35; Paulsson, supra note 68.
70. See REED ET AL., supra note 68, at 36; Paulsson, supra note 68.
71. Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 149.
72. Id. at 150.
73. As explained above, the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, and other arbitration rules explicitly provide for the right to assert
counterclaims. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
74. See Pierre A. Karrer, Jurisdiction on Set–off Defences and
Counterclaims, 67 Arb. 176, 177 (2001) (“[A]n arbitral tribunal should have
jurisdiction over counterclaims between the same parties, even if these
counterclaims are not covered by the arbitration agreement which confers
jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal over the main claim [. . .].”).
75. Laborde, supra note 58, at 100.
76. Limited Liability Company AMTO v. Ukraine, SCC Case No.
080/2005,
Final
Award,
(Mar.
26,
2008),
http://italaw.com/documents/AmtoAward.pdf.
77. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26.1, Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 360
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The State relied on Article 10 of the SCC rules and
asserted a counterclaim for non-material injury to its
78
reputation. The tribunal ruled that counterclaims were
outside of its jurisdiction because the State failed to specify the
basis for its counterclaim in applicable law:
. . . the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal over a State
Party counterclaim under an investment treaty depends
upon the terms of the dispute resolution provision of the
treaty, the nature of the counterclaim and the relationship of
79
the counterclaims with the claims in arbitration.

The tribunal in that case decided it could not go beyond its
subject matter jurisdiction and declined to assert jurisdiction
80
over the counterclaim. Had the ECT covered a wider category
of disputes or provided for investor obligations, the outcome
81
could have been different.
The ICSID tribunal in Roussalis v. Romania recently
rejected respondent’s counterclaim on the basis of an absence of
82
the investor’s consent. The tribunal focused on the dispute
resolution clause of the BIT, which provided for resolution of
83
disputes concerning obligations of the State.
The majority in that case reasoned that the relevant BIT
language which refers to “disputes . . . concerning an obligation
of the latter” limited jurisdiction to claims brought by investors
84
about obligations of the host State. The arbitrators further
[hereinafter ECT].
78. AMTO, SCC Case No. 080/2005 §§ 116–18. The SCC Arbitration Rules
provided for the right to counterclaim. See STOCKHOLM ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 13, art. 10.
79. AMTO, SCC Case No. 080/2005 § 118.
80. Id.
81. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may also
present the same problem. The NAFTA dispute settlement clause is limited to
obligations under specified articles of NAFTA. Under Articles 1116 and 1117
of NAFTA, the only claims which may be submitted to arbitration are claims
alleging that another NAFTA Party has breached an obligation under
specified articles of Chapter 11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
82. Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶¶
864–76
(Dec.
7,
2011),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70.
83. The Romania-Greece BIT provided for jurisdiction in “[d]isputes
between an investor of a Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party
concerning an obligation of the latter under this Agreement, in relation to an
investment of the former.” Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, supra note 62, art. 9.1.
84. Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 ¶ 869.
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explained that “where the BIT does specify that the applicable
law is the BIT itself, counterclaims fall outside the tribunal’s
85
jurisdiction.” Because the BIT did not impose any obligations
on the investor, counterclaims, according to the majority, fall
86
outside of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Professor Michael Reisman wrote a sharp dissent in
Roussalis v. Romania in which he criticized the majority’s
refusal to consider counterclaims on the merits as “an ironic, if
not absurd, outcome, at odds . . . with the objectives of
87
international investment law.” In his view, consent to ICSID
jurisdiction ipso facto includes consent to Article 46 of the
ICSID Convention, which provides for the right to counterclaim
88
both to the State and to the investor.
The Resiman’s position is not unprecedented. The ICSID
tribunal in Hamester v. Ghana considered a BIT clause similar
to the one in Romania v. Roussalis which provided that the
parties consent to disputes “concerning an obligation of [the
host State] under this Treaty in relation to an investment of [a
89
national or company of the other Contracting Party].” Strict
treaty interpretation would suggest that counterclaims would
not fall under the tribunal’s jurisdiction because the investor
was not a party to the treaty and the treaty did not provide for
obligations of investors. The tribunal, however, observed that
under this treaty a State could also be an aggrieved party and
90
refer disputes to arbitration.
In another case, Saluka v. Czech Republic, the relevant
dispute resolution clause covered a much wider spectrum of
85. Id. ¶ 871.
86. Id. The Majority’s view that the BIT is the applicable law seems
controversial because the parties explicitly chose Romanian law to govern the
merits of the dispute. Id. ¶ 306. Additionally, provisions of the BIT establish
that “the applicable rules and principles of international law” should apply to
the dispute. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, supra note 62, art. 9.4.
87. Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 (Separate Opinion of
Michael Reisman).
88. See id.
89. Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/07/24,
Award,
¶
354
(June
18,
2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (quoting Treaty for
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.–Ghana,
Feb.
24,
1995,
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_ghana.gr.pdf).
90. Gustav F W Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24 ¶¶ 351–52.
Eventually the tribunal ruled not to consider counterclaims any further,
because the State failed to properly submit on the nature of counterclaims
under the BIT. Id. ¶ 355.
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disputes, specifically: “[a]ll disputes between one Contracting
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party
91
concerning an investment of the latter.”
The tribunal
explained:
The language of Article 8, in referring to ‘All disputes,’ is
wide enough to include disputes giving rise to counterclaims,
so long, of course, as other relevant requirements are also
92
met.

This analysis of case law suggests that if the relevant
dispute resolution treaty provision is broad enough and is not
limited to obligations specifically provided by the treaty, the
tribunals are more likely to assert counterclaims against
investors. But as explained below, even in the context of
broadly formulated dispute resolution clauses, not all investor
obligations fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of
93
investor-state tribunals.
B. CONSENT TO COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST AFFILIATED
COMPANIES
Does foreign investor consent cover counterclaims against
affiliated parties, such as a parent company? Often the formal
claimant in arbitral proceedings is a local subsidiary
94
incorporated as a distinct corporate entity.
Its parent
company is protected from the subsidiary’s obligations by the
95
principle of limited liability. These local subsidiaries could be
undercapitalized and unable to pay any award rendered
91. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic, art. 8, Apr. 9, 1991, 2242 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
Netherlands Agreement].
92. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on
Jurisdiction Over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶ 39 (May 7, 2004), 15
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010). The Saluka tribunal subsequently decided that it had
no jurisdiction over the counterclaim, primarily because of the lack of a close
connection between the original claim and the counterclaim, which the
tribunal deemed to be a matter of Czech law and not something that fell under
the Agreement. See id. ¶¶ 79–82.
93. See infra Part IV.A–C.
94. See, e.g., Pierre Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday
Inns v. Morocco)—Some Legal Problems, 51(1) BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 123, 128
(1980) (explaining that the claimant in Holiday Inns v. Morocco was a
subsidiary that had not been fully formed at the time the agreement was
made, but that the tribunal still recognized its jurisdiction over the claim); see
also Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 184–86.
95. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, at 171–73 (explaining that limited
liability is one of the main rationales behind the corporate form and that
creating subsidiary companies can further shield business owners from risk).
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96

against them. It may be difficult, if at all possible, to make a
parent company with deeper pockets a party to arbitral
97
proceedings.
When a State-affiliated entity signs a contract, investors
can extend the clause to the State as a whole. The
International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility
explain when an entity is considered to be acting with the
authority of the State.
An entity whose structure, function, and control flows from
governmental authority, as well as the conduct of persons
empowered by the State to “exercise elements of the
governmental authority,” is considered to be acting with the
authority of the State “provided the person or entity is acting in
98
that capacity in the particular instance.” It is more difficult
for States to counterclaim against corporations that have not
signed the arbitration agreement. This is yet another
manifestation of the pro-investor asymmetry of investor-state
arbitration.
An ICSID tribunal analyzed whether to pierce the
corporate veil when faced with asserted counterclaims in
99
Klöckner v. Cameroon. The tribunal asserted its jurisdiction
and permitted the State to assert a counterclaim that involved
100
a
locally incorporated subsidiary, SOCAME.
The
Cameroonian government signed several agreements with the
claimant, Klöckner, and its domestically incorporated company,
96. See, e.g., id. at 173 (“A typical corporate veil piercing case involves a
controlling shareholder who sets up an undercapitalized corporation to incur
obligations to a third party.”).
97. See id. for a more detailed discussion of piercing the corporate veil.
98. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/83, art. 5 (Jan.
28, 2002). But not all affiliated entities’ actions are regarded as actions of the
State; instead, only those actions where the State acts as a sovereign. See, e.g.,
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret VE Sanay A.S. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 444 (Aug. 27, 2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf (“[T]his inquiry consists in
examining whether the alleged interference with the property or the rights of
the investor has been made in the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers.”);
Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 253
(Feb. 6, 2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009) (“[F]or the State to incur
international responsibility it must act as such, it must use its public
authority.”); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 547
(2008).
99. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 13–18 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994).
100. See id. at 15–16 (noting that the subsidiary SOCAME was under
foreign control at the time the agreements were signed between the parties,
which brought it under the arbitration agreement).
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SOCAME, which stipulated that ICSID arbitration would be
101
used in the event of disputes.
When the issue of
counterclaims against a locally incorporated company arose,
the arbitrators focused on subject matter jurisdiction over the
contract to ultimately allow the counterclaims to move forward,
instead of focusing on ICSID’s personal jurisdiction over a non102
signatory to the arbitration agreement.
The Klöckner tribunal explained that the main question
was not whether the tribunal had jurisdiction “ratione
103
personae” over the locally incorporated company, but rather
whether it had jurisdiction “ratione materiae” on the
application and interpretation of the Establishment
104
Agreement.
The tribunal concluded that the contracts
entered into by a local subsidiary establish the jurisdiction of
the tribunal with respect to the counterclaim because there was
a direct connection between the contracts and the parties’
105
claims.
In Saluka v. Czech Republic, a UNCITRAL case, the
investor contended that the tribunal had no personal
jurisdiction over the entity against which the State asserted a
counterclaim because that entity had never consented to be a
106
party to the arbitration.
The State responded that if the
locally incorporated entity was permitted to represent the
interests of the foreign parent company in arbitration, a
counterclaim could be asserted against the foreign parent
107
company. The State asked to pierce the corporate veil and
treat both companies as “the same single group of companies”
101. See id. at 13–18 (detailing the different agreements signed between
the companies and Cameroon, and the resulting disputes).
102. Id. at 17 (“The question before the present Tribunal is . . . to
determine whether it has jurisdiction ‘ratione materiae’ to rule on the
application and interpretation of the Establishment Agreement.”).
103. See id. (explaining that the foreign company was acting through the
local company, meaning that the contract was actually between the foreign
company and the host country, Cameroon).
104. See id. (noting that the Establishment Agreement should be taken
together with the Protocol of Agreement and the Supply Contract, which when
combined give the Arbitral Tribunal jurisdiction).
105. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 8 (Oct. 21, 1983), 2 ICSID Rep. 9 (1994) (“The
three contracts establish the jurisdiction of the tribunal with respect to the
counterclaim, given the direct connection between the three instruments and
the parties’ claims.”).
106. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶ 25 (May 7, 2004), 15
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010).
107. Id. ¶ 29.
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108

to redress abuse of the corporate form. The Saluka tribunal
refrained from ruling on the issue of piercing the corporate veil
and merely assumed that
the relationship between [the affiliated companies] is
sufficiently close to enable the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in
proceedings instituted by [the local subsidiary] to extend to
109
claims against [the parent company].

The tribunal ultimately held that it did not have
jurisdiction for two reasons: first, because there was an absence
of a close connection between the primary claim and the
110
counterclaim; and second, because the contract established a
special dispute resolution procedure for the issues contested in
111
the counterclaim.
It appears that tribunals are reluctant to pierce the
corporate veil in the counterclaim context because
counterclaims may fall outside of the parties’ consent to
arbitration. Even if a tribunal decides to assert jurisdiction
over affiliated companies, the party enforcing the resulting
112
award may face serious challenges. Enforcing awards against
parent companies located in other countries in the absence of
their explicit consent to arbitration requires piercing the
corporate veil, which can be problematic under applicable
arbitration rules, relevant domestic law, and the New York
113
Convention. The only exception is an award granted under
the ICSID Convention. Such award should be enforced as if it
114
is a final judgment of a domestic court of that State.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 44.
110. Id. ¶¶ 47–82 (“[T]he disputes which have given rise to the
Respondent’s counterclaim are not sufficiently closely connected with the
subject matter of the original claim put forward by Saluka to fall within the
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”). But see Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 157
(“[C]ommentators have also criticised the connection required in Klöckner and
Saluka as being too demanding, suggesting that a close factual nexus should
be enough or that the fact that the counterclaim arises from the same
‘investment’ as the claim suffices.”); ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 260–63 (2009) (explaining the different outcomes
in different tribunals in regards to the requirement of a “requisite nexus”).
111. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on
Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 47–82 (May 7, 2004),
15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010).
112. See, e.g., Kryvoi, supra note 12, 175–77 (explaining the different legal
grounds on which an affiliated company party may assert in order to challenge
an arbitration award).
113. Id.
114. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.1 (“A Contracting State with
a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal
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The next section analyzes in more detail whether foreign
investors have not only rights but also international obligations
vis-à-vis host States.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS OF INVESTORS IN
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
A. INVESTORS AS BEARERS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
According to the traditional doctrine of international law,
only States, not individuals, can be the subjects of obligation
115
and responsibility in international law. Until the second half
of the Twentieth century, the dominant principle of
international law was that a wrong done to a national of one
State, for which another State was intentionally responsible,
was not actionable by the injured national, but instead was
116
only actionable by his State.
Investors were not able to
proceed with an international claim against a foreign
117
government directly.
In the past, foreign investors had to seek the diplomatic
protection of their home State to support their case and to
118
initiate proceedings before an international tribunal.
In
recent years, the legal status of investors in international law
has been shifting from this classical position to the recognition
119
of an increased role of individual rights.
courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a
final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”).
115. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 194
(1966) (“The traditional doctrine that only states, not individuals, are the
subjects of international law means that the personal sphere of validity of the
international legal order is limited.”).
116. See generally Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Diplomatic Protection of
Shareholders in International Law, 4 PHIL. INT’L L.J. (1965) (explaining
diplomatic and judicial protection in greater detail).
117. KELSEN, supra note 115, at 194 (discussing how the traditional
doctrine of international law only conferred rights upon States, meaning that
individuals did not have rights and therefore could not bring suit against
States).
118. See KRYVOI, supra note 5, at 26 (explaining that investor inability to
reach States through legal suits was one of the reasons for the formation of
ICSID).
119. See generally PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND THE LAW (2007) (discussing the evolving status of multinational
enterprises); DAVID IJALAYE, THE EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221–37 (1978) (explaining that private
companies doing foreign business have developed a legal footing similar to
that of States, even though this position in international law is challenged by
some).
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One of earliest examples recognizing an individual’s civil
responsibility is the International Convention for the
Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, which provided that
an individual who broke a submarine cable had an obligation to
120
pay for the cost of repair of the cable.
Individual
responsibility is also recognized under international law, for
example, in cases of piracy, breach of blockade, carriage of
121
contraband, and acts of illegitimate warfare.
In theory, subjects of international law are “persons to
whom international law attributes rights and duties directly
122
and not through the medium of their states.” In the investorstate context, tribunals assume that investors have the
capacity to contract for the right to sue States in investor-state
123
disputes. As the sole arbitrator in Texaco v. Libya explained:
“[F]or the purposes of interpretation and performance of the
contract, it should be recognized that a private contracting
124
party has specific international capacities.”
Individual investors can now initiate an action against a
State before a tribunal, the jurisdiction of which the State is
125
obliged to recognize. Investor rights to sue States in investorstate disputes was a significant advancement of the status of
individuals compared to claims commissions, which States had
126
previously used to resolve investor grievances. As discussed
above, international law also imposes certain obligations on
foreign investors directly that are not attributable through the
127
medium of States.
The primary source of investor obligations in international
120. International Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph
Cables art. IV, Mar. 4, 1884, T.S. No. 380, available at
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/1902/1884-convention-for-the-protection-of-submarinetelegraph-cables/.
121. See IJALAYE, supra note 119, at 203–07.
122. Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of
Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 533, 535 (1956).
123. See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 67–72 (1991).
124. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶ 47 (Jan. 19, 1977), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
125. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 115, at 221–22 (“International law,
especially a treaty, confers rights on individuals by authorizing private
persons to bring a lawsuit against a state before a national or an international
tribunal.”).
126. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 83, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat.
1245 (establishing conciliation commissions); Treaty of Peace with Japan art.
4, Sept. 8, 1951, 59 Stat. 1031 (establishing property commissions).
127. See supra notes 115–125 and accompanying text.
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arbitration is the applicable law agreed upon by the parties.
Relevant international investment treaties may contain choice
of law provisions. For instance, the treaty in Saluka v. Czech
Republic provided for the use of the domestic law of the host
State, provisions of the BIT and other agreements between the
parties, “provisions of special agreements related to the
129
investment,” and the “general principles of law.” As explained
below, investment treaties are often silent on the issue of
applicable law and even when domestic law is chosen, not all
domestic law obligations rise to a level arbitable at the
international level.
B. DOMESTIC LAW AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Investment treaties usually contain no provisions on the
130
issue of applicable law. In some cases, investment treaties
refer both to domestic law and international law as applicable
131
law. In other cases, treaties are unclear about which law is
132
applicable. According to the ICSID Convention, if the parties
fail to agree on applicable law, the law of the host State
133
applies.
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as well as other
institutional arbitration rules give discretion to the tribunal to
134
determine what law should apply in such situations.
Investor failure to comply with the laws of the host State
may act to exclude the investment from protection under the
investment treaty. For example, in Maffezini v. Spain, the
tribunal held that the Argentine investor’s failure to comply
with its environmental regulations constituted a violation of

128. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 42.1 (“The Tribunal shall decide
a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties.
In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the
Contracting State party . . . and such rules of international law as may be
applicable.”).
129. Netherlands Agreement, supra note 91, art. 8.6.
130. See Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE
FORDHAM PAPERS 2007 3, 7–8 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2007).
131. See, e.g., TAIDA BEGIC, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 232 (2005).
132. Id. (explaining that often treaties are written in a way that makes the
parties’ choice of law “not . . . clear and explicit”).
133. ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 42.1.
134. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, rule 35.1 (stipulating
that the tribunal must apply the law that is chosen by the parties, but also
noting that if the parties fail to identify which law should apply, the tribunal
will elect the applicable law for them).
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135

the investor’s obligations. In the 2006 case, Inceysa v. El
Salvador, the tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis of an
investment treaty provision that the investment must be made
136
in accordance with the laws of the host country. The tribunal
held that an investment made through fraudulent means could
137
not be made in accordance with law.
Although applicable domestic law contemplates investor
obligations, not all domestic law obligations rise to the level of
international law obligations. Counterclaims arising out of the
application of domestic law of general applicability usually fall
outside of the international tribunals’ jurisdictions.
For instance, in a number of cases before the IUSCT, Iran
counterclaimed requesting allegedly unpaid taxes and social
138
security contributions.
The IUSCT tribunals usually held
that such counterclaims arise not out of the contracts that were
the subject matter of the investor’s claim, but out of the
139
generally applicable domestic law. This approach remained
the same even if the contract upon which a claim was based
expressly allocated the burden to comply with such domestic
140
law requirements to the claimant.
A good example of an ICSID case with the same logic is
Amco v. Indonesia, in which the State asserted a counterclaim
141
seeking payment of taxes and customs duties. Subsequently,
142
Indonesia modified its counterclaim and alleged tax fraud.
The tribunal eventually ruled that because the claim did not
arise “directly out of an investment,” as required by the ICSID
135. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award,
(Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002).
136. Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/26,
Award
(Aug.
2,
2006),
http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf.
137. Id. ¶¶ 230–64 (analyzing the fraudulent actions under international
and El Salvadoran law).
138. Petrolane, Inc. v. Iran, 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, ¶ 118 (1991);
Questech, Inc. v. Ministry of Nat’l Def. of Islamic Republic of Iran, 9 Iran-U.S.
Cl. Trib. Rep. 107, 134–36 (1985).
139. Petrolane, Inc., 27 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 64, ¶ 118; Questech, Inc., 9
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 134–36.
140. See, e.g., Int’l Technical Prods. Corp. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 206, 224–26 (1985).
141. Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, Award, ¶¶ 283–87 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413 (1993).
142. Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case: Decision on Jurisdiction, 562–64 (May 10, 1988),
1 ICSID Rep. 543 (1993). The tribunal considered the tax fraud as a new claim
because Indonesia did not introduce it as a counterclaim in accordance with
ICSID Arbitration Rules. Id. at 564–65.
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Convention, the tax fraud case was outside its jurisdiction.
The tribunal also distinguished between rights and obligations
provided by the investment treaty and generally applicable
rights and obligations:
[I]t is correct to distinguish between rights and obligations
that are applicable to legal or natural persons who are
within the reach of a host State’s jurisdiction, as a matter of
general law; and rights and obligations that are applicable to
an investor as a consequence of an investment agreement
entered into with that host State.
Legal disputes relating to the latter will fall under Article
25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes concerning the
former, in principle, are to be decided by the appropriate
procedures in the relevant jurisdiction unless the general
law generates an investment dispute under the
144
Convention.

The same logic on arbitrability of domestic law claims in
investor-state arbitration appeared in Saluka v. Czech
145
Republic, a dispute governed by UNCITRAL rules. Like in
Amco v. Indonesia, the tribunal emphasized that the
counterclaims involved “non-compliance with the general law of
the Czech Republic” and “rights and obligations which are
applicable, as a matter of the general law of the Czech
Republic, to persons subject to the Czech Republic’s
146
jurisdiction.” The tribunal concluded that the counterclaims
were to be decided not through the investment treaty
settlement procedure, but through appropriate procedures
147
under Czech law.
More recently, a UNCITRAL tribunal was asked to decide
148
a tax counterclaim in Paushok v. Mongolia.
The tribunal
ruled the claim was outside its jurisdiction because the claim
149
arose out of the public law of Mongolia.
It explained its
decision:
[T]hrough the Counterclaims the Respondent seeks to
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id.
145. Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on
Jurisdiction over Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 78–79 (May 7, 2004), 15
ICSID Rep. 256 (2010) (applying UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
146. Id.
147. Id. ¶ 79.
148. See Sergei Paushok v. Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award
on
Jurisdiction
and
Liability,
¶
678
(Apr.
28,
2011),
http://italaw.com/documents/PaushokAward.pdf.
149. Id. ¶¶ 684–99.
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extend the extraterritorial application and enforcement of
its public laws, and in particular its tax laws, to
individuals or entities not subject to and not having
accepted to submit to Mongolian public law or its courts.
Thus, if the Arbitral Tribunal extended its jurisdiction to
the Counterclaims, it would be acquiescing to a possible
exorbitant extension of Mongolia’s legislative jurisdiction
without any legal basis under international law to do so,
since the generally accepted principle is the nonextraterritorial enforceability of national public laws and,
150
specifically, of national tax laws.

General measures such as tax or economic policy are
normally outside the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals as
long as they do not result in a violation of prior international
151
law commitments. But if such measures have a specific effect
on the violation of preexisting commitments, they may fall
152
under the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.
In summary, counterclaims can be based on domestic law
obligations of investors only if those same obligations were
specifically mentioned in the relevant investment treaty or
otherwise committed to by the parties. Violation of purely
domestic law obligations is usually insufficient for an investorstate tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over counterclaims.
C. CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS
Most investor-state disputes involve one or more contracts
concluded between the foreign investor and the State. That
could be a privatization contract, a concession contract, a
license agreement, or other types of contract. Unlike
investment treaties, these contracts also include concrete
investor obligations in addition to obligations of States. It is
important to understand whether obligations of investors
arising out of contracts can fall under the jurisdiction of
investor-state tribunals.
150. Id. ¶ 695.
151. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1,
Award,
¶
489
(Dec.
7,
2011),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC2431_En&caseId=C70; El Paso Energy International
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Apr. 27, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 488 (2006). For a UNCITRAL
dispute, see GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award, ¶¶ 26–43 (Nov.
15, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 545 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 ¶ 490; El Paso
Energy International Co., 21 ICSID Rev. ¶ 97.
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UNCITRAL and ICC arbitration rules provide that
contract provisions should be taken into account when
153
tribunals resolve disputes.
The reason why most arbitration
rules explicitly cover contractual obligations is that those rules
were originally developed for resolution of purely contractual
disputes between private parties. Even the ICSID Convention
was adopted primarily with contractual disputes in mind—
when the Convention was finalized in 1965, there were almost
154
no investment treaties. On the other hand, nothing in Article
46 of the ICSID Convention implies that its purpose was only
to encompass contractual disputes and to exclude investment
155
treaty arbitrations.
But it would be wrong to conclude that any obligations in
contracts concluded between the foreign investor and the host
State automatically rise to the level of being arbitrable by
investor-state tribunals. As James Crawford suggested,
contractual jurisdiction can be invoked under any sufficiently
broad investment treaty dispute resolution clause as long as
156
three conditions are met. First, the contract should relate to
an investment rather than being an ordinary contract for the
157
supply of goods or services. Second, the contract should be
with the State itself and not with a separate legal entity
158
controlled by the State or a third party. Third, the contract
with the State should not have its own dispute resolution
159
clause.
The same logic applies to counterclaims. States can assert
counterclaims arising out of investor contractual obligations if
there is a sufficiently broad investment treaty clause, and the
investment contract with the State does not have its own
160
dispute resolution mechanism. For instance, the Saluka v.
153. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 13, art. 35.3; ICC
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 13, art. 17.2.
154. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 1–10, 81–83, 129–30, 144–45 (1995).
155. Lalive & Halonen, supra note 11, at 143.
156. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of Int’l Law, Univ. of Cambridge,
Freshfields Lecture on Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 13
(Nov.
29,
2007),
available
at
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Freshfields%20Lecture%202007.
pdf.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Decision on Jurisdiction over Czech Republic’s Counterclaim, ¶¶ 37–39, 55–57
(May 7, 2004), 15 ICSID Rep. 256 (2010).
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Czech
Republic
tribunal
rejected
jurisdiction
over
counterclaims arising from the Share Purchase Agreement
because the agreement contained a separate dispute resolution
161
clause.
Subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals widens
when treaty provisions guarantee the host State’s observance of
all obligations or commitments entered into vis-à-vis foreign
investors. These provisions are commonly known as umbrella
162
clauses. Umbrella clauses are often referred to as pacta sunt
servanda clauses because their purpose is to ensure that
163
contracts are respected. A typical umbrella clause provides
that: “Each party shall observe any obligation it may have
164
entered into with regard to investments.” According to Elihu
Lauterpacht, the effect of umbrella clauses is to “put [investorstate contracts] on a special plane in that breach of them
165
becomes immediately a breach of convention.”
The precise nature and effect of umbrella clauses is
uncertain. Some commentators interpret them as protecting
“the investor’s contractual rights against any interference
which might be caused by either a simple breach of contract or
166
by administrative or legislative acts.” The application of this
principle, however, does not explain whether umbrella clauses
167
also cover purely commercial contracts.
Some tribunals
consider these clauses as automatically elevating the host
State’s breaches of contract with investors to a treaty
168
violation. Other tribunals rejected this interpretation without

161. Id. ¶¶ 55–57.
162. See Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing
and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 135, 142–50 (2006).
163. See id. at 142–43.
164. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, supra note 7, 31 I.L.M. at 130.
165. Elihu Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of
Investment, in THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 18, 31 (1962).
166. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 154, at 81–82.
167. U.N.
Conference
in
Investment
Rulemaking,
at
74,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, U.N on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment
Treaties 1995-2006: Trends. Sales No. E.06.II.D.16 (2007).
168. See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 113–29 (Jan. 29, 2004), 8 ISCID Rep. 518 (2005); Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 46–62 (Oct. 12, 2005),
http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf.
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169

explaining the meaning of the umbrella clauses.
In the context of counterclaims, reliance on umbrella
clauses to create investor obligations is problematic for another
reason. Investment treaties usually provide that “Parties” (that
170
is, States) should comply with their commitments. Thus, in a
strict sense umbrella clauses are not intended to impose any
obligations on investors, only on States.
To summarize, purely contractual investor obligations do
not fall under the jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals. The
State, however, may assert counterclaims under a sufficiently
broad investment treaty clause if the investor breached its
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the
State.
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW
a. Relevant Sources of International Law
As discussed above, investment treaties often provide that
domestic law and international law govern disputes between
171
the State and the investor. In some cases, only international
law governs substantive rights and obligations—for instance,
172
the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Energy
173
Charter Treaty
provide for international law as the sole
source of the applicable law.
A number of ICSID tribunals have explained that
international law remains applicable in ICSID proceedings
174
unless the parties have specifically excluded its application.
If domestic law is chosen as applicable, international law plays
175
a supplemental and corrective function.
This means that
international law fills the gaps in the host State’s laws, and if
169. See, e.g., Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 163–74 (Aug. 6, 2003), 8 ICSID Rep. 406 (2005).
170. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, supra note 7, 31 I.L.M. at 130.
171. See BEGIC, supra note 131, at 232.
172. NAFTA, supra note 81, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
173. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 400.
174. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 86–87 (May 25, 2004), 12 ICSID Rep. 6 (2007); Southern
Pacific Properties (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 84 (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1995); Amco Asia
Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted
Case: Award, ¶¶ 37–40 (May 31, 1990), 1 ICSID Rep. 569 (1993).
175. DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 570–71, 985–86.

2012]

COUNTERCLAIMS

243

there is a conflict between international and domestic law,
176
international law prevails.
This principle is consistent with
the general rule of international law under which States are
not allowed to rely on domestic law to avoid performing their
177
obligations under treaties.
According to the Report of ICSID Executive Directors, the
term ‘international law’ has the same meaning as Article 38(1)
178
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Article 38(1) provides a classical definition of sources of
international law:
international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
. . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
179
means for the determination of rules of law.

It is important to understand that parties in ICJ
proceedings for which the ICJ Statute had been adopted are
180
Investor-state disputes are different
sovereign States.
because one party is not a sovereign. Therefore, general
international law should be applied differently in the context of
international investment law, which constitutes a selfcontained legal regime.
According to international law theory, self-contained
regimes are interrelated wholes of primary and secondary rules
that cover some particular problem differently from the way it
181
would be covered under general law.
Examples of self176. See BEGIC, supra note 131, at 155; Aaron Broches, The Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 387–93 (1972).
177. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, 1155
U.N.T.S. at 339 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”).
178. Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Report of the Executive
Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (Mar. 18, 1965), compiled in ICSID
Convention, Rules and Regulations, at 47, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
179. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945,
59 stat. 1055.
180. Id. art. 34(1).
181. See generally Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
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contained regimes include WTO law or the law of diplomatic
182
protection.
A self-contained regime (lex specialis) provides
interpretative guidance that in some ways deviates from the
183
rules of general law (lex generalis).
As the Iran-US Claims Tribunal explained in Amoco v
Iran:
As a lex specialis in relations between the two countries, the
Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary
international law . . . however . . . the rules of customary
international law may be useful in order to fill in possible
lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined
terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and
184
implementation of its provisions.

In the past, investor-state tribunals applied treaties,
customary international law, and general principles of law in
addition to investment treaties to determine the obligations of
185
the parties. As the analysis below suggests, not all of these
sources of international law help determine investor
obligations.
b. International Conventions
International conventions, and in particular investment
treaties, are the first and foremost source of international law
applied by investor-state tribunals. In addition to investment
treaties, multilateral treaties such as NAFTA and ECT contain
186
provisions for arbitration of investor-state disputes.
They
provide specific rights of foreign investors such as protection
against expropriation and the right to fair and equitable
187
treatment.
It is not surprising that while treaties provide for investor
rights, investor obligations are not there. Investors cannot be
parties to international treaties concluded by States. Can
and Expansion of International Law: Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law
Comm’n, 58th sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682, 68 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi).
182. Id. at 65–69.
183. Id. at 70.
184. Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, ¶ 112, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 189 (1987).
185. Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An
Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 301, 309–14, 328–33 (2008).
186. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 399–401; NAFTA, supra note 81, 32
I.L.M. at 642–47.
187. ECT, supra note 77, 34 I.L.M. at 363; NAFTA, supra note 81, 32
I.L.M. at 639–42.
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treaties, in principle, impose obligations on investors who are
not parties to them? If treaties were treated as regular
contracts, then no obligations could be imposed on third
parties, only rights. According to a universally accepted
principle of contract law, a third party cannot be subjected to a
188
burden by a contract to which it is not a party.
A number of developing countries advocate for inclusion of
investor obligations directly in international investment
agreements. In 2002, China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, and
Zimbabwe proposed that discussions on a multilateral
framework on trade and investment also look at legally binding
measures aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility and
189
accountability relating to foreign investors.
In particular,
they insisted on the need to comply with all domestic laws and
regulations in all aspects of the economic and social lives of the
190
host States in their activities.
Investors, however, are already required to abide by
domestic laws of the State in which they operate.
This is a consequence not only of domestic law
requirements, but also of the international law principle of
191
territorial sovereignty. The host State, as a sovereign actor,
can react to investor misconduct by unilaterally imposing
sanctions and enforcing them against the assets of the
192
investment project. This is a power the host State already
193
possesses and that the foreign investor lacks. Although this
principle is sometimes spelled out in international
194
agreements, it applies by virtue of public international law in
188. EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 133 (Marise Cremona ed., 4th
ed. 2000).
189. See Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and
Investment, Communication from China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan and
Zimbabwe: Investors' and Home Governments’ Obligations, WT/WGTI/W/152
(received Nov. 19, 2002).
190. See id.
191. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 98, at 105–07 (explaining the
concepts of territory, sovereignty, and territorial sovereignty).
192. See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, “Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in
International Investment Law, Working Papers on International Investment
Number
2004/4
(Sept.
2004),
available
at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf (discussing how the scope of a host
State’s power to regulate the rights and obligations of investors is
determined).
193. See Brower & Schill, supra note 6, at 482. There are also situations in
which investors do not keep sufficient assets in the host States which prevents
this mechanism from working effectively.
194. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Framework Agreement on the
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195

any event.
Because investment and other treaties usually do not
provide for specific investor obligations, such obligations should
be looked for in other primary and secondary sources of
international law such as international custom and general
principles of law.
c. International Custom
If investor obligations are not set out in relevant treaties,
or if their provisions are not sufficiently complete, the tribunal
may refer to international custom unless the treaty refers to
196
the application of different law (for example, domestic law).
For instance, in ADC v. Hungary, the tribunal first applied
the relevant investment treaty and then explained that consent
to arbitration
must also be deemed to comprise a choice for general
international law, including customary international law, if
and to the extent that it comes into play for interpreting and
197
applying the provisions of the Treaty.

According to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, international
custom constitutes “evidence of a general practice accepted as
198
law.” The definition includes two basic elements—the actual
behavior of States, and the psychological or subjective belief
199
that such behavior is law.
The ICSID Convention drafters discussed a number of
rules of customary international law. These rules included the
200
obligation to act in good faith,
protection against
ASEAN Investment Area, art. 13 (Oct. 7, 1998) (allowing Member States to
undertake any measures necessary to protect national security, public morals,
the prevention of fraud or deceptive practices, and to ensure compliance with
their tax obligations in the host jurisdiction).
195. See id.
196. Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, supra note 179.
197. ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 290 (Oct. 2, 2006), 15 ICSID Rep. 534; see also Siemens
AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 349 (Feb. 6,
2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 518 (2009) (looking at customary international law to
determine the standard of compensation for unlawful expropriation).
198. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
199. Rajendra Ramlogan, The Environment and International Law:
Rethinking the Traditional Approach, 3 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2001–2002).
200. Regional Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts on Settlement of
Investment Disputes, Chairman’s Report on Issues Raised and Suggestions
Made With Respect to the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. IV, ¶
59, Z11 (July 9, 1964), in 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF
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201

discriminatory treatment,
the prohibition of measures
202
contrary to international public policy,
pacta sunt
203
204
servanda, the exhaustion of local remedies, and rules on
205
State succession. The ICSID Convention, however, mentions
none of these principles. Moreover, it is difficult to apply these
principles to investor conduct because they deal primarily with
conduct of States rather than private parties such as investors.
Do the most important rules of international customary
206
law, known as jus cogens norms (for example, prohibition of
genocide, slavery), affect obligations of investors? That would
be problematic because only States (and individuals under
certain circumstances), but not corporations, are responsible
207
under international law for violations of such norms.
Moreover, corporate criminal liability generally exists neither
in international law nor in the majority of domestic legal
208
systems.
The main problem in applying customary international law
is that it develops as a result of interaction between States and
209
is meant to create obligations for States,
not private
investors. Customary international law affects interpretations
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, 557 (International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968).
201. See Settlement of Investment Disputes Consultative Meeting of Legal
Experts, Summary Record of Proceedings, art. IV, at 51, Z9 (June 1, 1964), in
2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION, 367 (International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968).
202. See Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes,
Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, SID/LC/SR/14, art. 44,
at 3 (Dec. 30, 1964) in 2 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION, 799 (International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, Washington, D.C., 1968).
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 65, art. 53 (“[A]
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”).
207. See, e.g., The I.G. Farben Trial, Case No. 57, The Judgment of the
Tribunal X L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIMS. 30, 52 (1948).
208. ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47
(3rd ed. 2007).
209. See BROWNLIE, supra note 98, at 6–12.
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of treaties and obligations of one State vis-à-vis another but
does not directly create obligations of investors. On the other
hand, general principles of law are helpful for determining
obligations of non-State actors such as investors as discussed
below.
d. General Principles of Law
General principles of law have played a prominent role in
210
arbitrations between States and foreign nationals,
as the
jurisprudence of the IUSCT and ICSID cases demonstrates.
General principles of law can come from comparative municipal
211
law, the lex mercatoria, and public international law.
Choosing domestic law as applicable does not make general
principles of law irrelevant. The sole arbitrator in a non-ICSID
investor-state dispute in Texaco v. Libya explained the
relevance of general principles of law when domestic Libyan
law was chosen as applicable. The arbitrator provided that:
[T]he application of the principles of Libyan [domestic] law
does not have the effect of ruling out the application of the
principles of international law, but quite the contrary: it
simply requires us to combine the two in verifying the
212
conformity of the first with the second.

The arbitrator relied both on the principle of the binding
force of contracts recognized by Libyan law and on the principle
pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), which is
213
essential to international law.
The United Nations Charter recognizes the importance of
214
the principle of good faith. This principle comes into play in
215
the context of the exercise of rights by States and is otherwise
210. Richard B. Lillich, The Law Governing Disputes under Economic
Development Agreements: Reexamining the Concept of “Internalization,” in
ST
ARBITRATION
IN
THE
21
CENTURY:
TOWARDS
INTERNATIONAL
“JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 61, 107–10 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles
N. Brower eds., 1993); K. Lipstein, International Arbitration Between
Individuals and Governments and the Conflict of Laws, in CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GEORGE
SCHWARZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 177 (Bin Cheng & E. D.
Brown eds., 1988).
211. Grant Hanessian, “General Principles of Law” in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 309, 318 (1988).
212. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶ 49 (Jan. 19, 1977), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
213. See id. ¶ 51.
214. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2.
215. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121 (George W. Keeton & Georg
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described as the prohibition of malicious injury, that is, the
exercise of a right—or supposed right—for the sole purpose of
216
causing injury to another.
The principle of good faith establishes interdependence
between the rights of an investor and its obligations. A bona
fide exercise of a right is expected rather than an exercise
217
aimed at procuring an unfair advantage. The exercise of a
right in a manner which prejudices the interests of the other
218
party (the State) would constitute a breach of the principle.
International arbitration tribunals have developed
increasingly specialized general principles of law in their case
219
law. The general principle of good faith gives rise to more
specific obligations such as good faith in the conclusion,
220
interpretation, and performance of contracts. An even more
specific principle would be interpretation against a party that
221
unilaterally drafted a contract.
Other examples of general principles of law applied by
222
investor-state tribunals include restitutio in integrum and an
223
injured person’s duty to mitigate damages. Tribunals have
224
225
also applied principles of pacta sunt servanda, estoppel,
Schwarzenberger eds., 1953). For an application of the principle in an ICSID
context, see Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/03/26,
Award,
¶¶
230–39
(Aug.
2,
2006),
http://italaw.com/documents/Inceysa_Vallisoletana_en_001.pdf.
216. See CHENG, supra note 215, at 122. For an application of this principle
in an investor-state context, see Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶¶ 154–58 (Mar. 21, 2007), 22
ICSID Rev. 100 (2007). See also Waguih Elie George Siag v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 213 (Apr. 11,
2007), http://italaw.com/documents/Siagv.Egypt.pdf.
217. See CHENG, supra note 215, at 125.
218. Id.
219. See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 54 (2010).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co./Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, ¶¶ 97–109 (Jan. 19, 1977),
17 I.L.M. 1 (1978); see also Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Award, ¶ 268 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID Rep. 413
(1993).
223. See Middle E. Cement Shipping and Handling Co. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 167 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep.
173 (2005).
224. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., 17 I.L.M. ¶ 51.
225. See S. Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/3, Award, ¶ 247 (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 102 (1995); see
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nemo auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans (prohibition
226
from benefiting from one’s own fraud), exceptio non adimpleti
contractus (person who is being sued for non-performance of
contractual obligations can defend themselves by proving that
227
the plaintiff did not perform their side of the bargain), unjust
228
229
enrichment, and general principles of contract law.
Unlike international treaties or international customary
law, general principles of law can provide for obligations of
private parties. In the absence of specific provisions setting out
obligations of investors in international treaties, these
principles of law serve as an appropriate source of law to
determine obligations of investors in investor-state arbitration.
e. Jurisprudence and Scholarly Writings
While some general principles of law and legal rules are
230
codified and easy to access, other principles are more difficult
231
to identify. In practice, tribunals often skip the process of
finding the “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations” mentioned in Article 28 of the ICJ Statute because it
is difficult and time-consuming. Instead, tribunals tend to rely
232
on relevant international jurisprudence.
International law does not operate on the basis of stare
decisis or prior ICSID awards. Even prior ICSID awards
applying similar investment treaty language do not constitute
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binding precedent. Many investor-state tribunals, however,
found themselves not barred, as a matter of principle, from
considering the position taken or the opinion expressed by
234
other tribunals.
An ICSID tribunal in ADC v. Hungary emphasized, despite
their non-binding nature, that
cautious reliance on certain principles developed [in
case law], as persuasive authority, may advance the
body of law, which in turn may serve predictability in
235
the interest of both investors and host States.

In addition to case law, investor-state tribunals often rely
236
on scholarly writings to help establish norms of law.
Therefore, international jurisprudence and scholarly
writings can be used as subsidiary means of identifying
investor obligations in investor-state disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
The growing number of counterclaims submitted by States
goes hand in hand with the growing number of investor-state
disputes. The 2010 revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, which broadened jurisdiction of UNCITRAL tribunals,
will further increase the number of State counterclaims.
Correct understanding of the mechanism of investor consent to
counterclaims and correct identification of investor obligations
will make the system of investor-state dispute resolution more
efficient and fair.
Investor consent to counterclaims is essential. The relevant
treaty dispute resolution clause affects jurisdiction of investorstate tribunals. If the treaty contains an offer of jurisdiction
only in relation to disputes arising out of State obligations, it
may be difficult for the tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over
counterclaims unless the parties subsequently alter this offer
by an explicit or implicit agreement.
Identification of investor obligations is crucial to
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determining the substantive content of the procedural right to
counterclaim. Although investment treaties usually do not
provide for investor obligations, such obligations can be found
in other sources of law.
Counterclaims cannot be based on domestic law obligations
of investors unless such obligations were specifically mentioned
in the relevant investment treaty or otherwise violate the
parties’ preexisting international law commitments. Otherwise,
violation of purely domestic law obligations is insufficient for
an investor-state tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over
counterclaims.
In the absence of concrete provisions setting out investor
obligations in international treaties, general principles of law
appear to be an appropriate source of international law to
determine such obligations.
Contractual obligations of investors fall outside of the
jurisdiction of investor-state tribunals with one exception. The
State may assert counterclaims if the investor breached its
obligations under the investment contract concluded with the
State provided that the relevant investment treaty or an
arbitration agreement contains a sufficiently broad dispute
resolution clause.

